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Visual-Thinking  
in Congenitally Blind Individuals 
 
 
Abstract: What is mental imagery like for the congenitally blind? Using a combined storytelling and clay modelling task 
and an analysis of the clay models in terms of a physical ontological concept, we observed the visual-like abstraction of 
congenitally blind individuals. Next, we observed their distinct mental lexicon construction through an analysis of how 
they include attributive adjectives of an animal’s savageness using semantic memory. The results demonstrated that 
visual thinking is a conflict between immature visual cognitive resource with critical adult logic induced by the absence 
of visual recognition and the proper resources for a mental lexicon. This leads to feelings of estrangement, which allows 
this ambiguous concept to occur. To capture visual phenomena, their brain harnesses another particular mode of 
thinking, associative and/or bisociative thinking, as a referral in addition to employing self-body referencing as an 
archetype. We discuss how these findings can be applied to possible employment opportunities for people with visual 
impairments.  
 
Keywords: Visual Thinking, Congenitally Blind, Creativity, Bisociative Thinking, Clay Modeling 
 
Introduction 
t has long been observed that the absence of vision appears to enhance processing by the 
remaining senses (James 1950). However, divergent results have been reported in studies 
investigating spatial cognition (Proulx et al. 2016; Pasqualotto et al. 2018). How does the 
blind brain support such superior processing? There is substantial evidence that the brain uses the 
visual cortex to support behavioral enhancements (Pasqualotto and Proulx 2012). Many 
empirical studies have reported results supporting this view, showing that blind persons can have 
superior perceptual discrimination and localization, verbal processing, and memory capacity, as 
noted in a recent review by Pasqualotto and Proulx (2012). Blindness enhances the sensory 
modalities (Scheller, Petrini, and Proulx 2019; Fielder and Proulx 2019). Compensatory 
plasticity enhances the auditory (hearing), somatic sensation (touch), gustatory (taste), olfaction 
(smell) and vestibular (balance/movement) senses. Thus, the realm of the mind where blind 
people interpret information and create perception can be extraordinarily distinct from sighted 
people (Dell’Erba, Brown, and Proulx 2018).  
Mental Imagery of Congenitally Blind Individuals 
Most of the research concerning visual imagery focus on activation in primary visual areas by 
means quantitative and technological devices for analyzing. Kosslyn et al. (1999) uses 
convergent techniques: PET and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), Farah et.al. 
(1988) measured event-related electrical potentials in the brain using ERP, D’Esposito et.al. 
(1997) investigated neural substrates of mental image generation with functional MRI (fMRI), 
and Knauff et al. (2000) also conducted an experiment with fMRI. Lopes (2003) studies visual 
activation in dreams and its relationship with EEG’s spectral components. 
I 
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Most of these studies, though, have investigated the underlying mechanisms of visual 
imagery with quantitative approaches that have paid less attention to activity itself. Moreover, 
most of this work has focused on the sighted only. A few studies have reported that congenitally 
blind (CB) individuals, who have never experienced sight, are able to visualize and have capacity 
for visual imagery with slight or no differences when compared with normal sighted subjects 
(Bértolo 2003). Yet mental imagery in CB individuals is uniquely different to sighted people 
(Cattaneo and Vecchi 2011). CB individuals create specific pattern that allows object to be 
recognized as unique without retinal inputs as seeing with the “mind’s eye” based only in the 
preservation of metric and spatial properties (Bértolo 2005). The ability to perceive and extract 
surrounding information relies on the remaining intact senses and common sense. However, the 
absence of visual experience certainly prevents CB individuals from accessing pattern 
recognition or principles of organization.  To capture the visualizable phenomena, the brain 
harnesses another particular mode of thinking—associative and/or bisociative thinking—as a 
referral by way of traditional Aristotelian categorization and Rosch's prototype theory (Koestler 
1976a; Rosch 1975; Homa et al. 2009).  
Koestler (1976b) coined the term “bisociation” to describe the combinatorial nature of a 
creativity event. Bisociation requires two incompatible concepts, which are not normally 
associated, to create a collision of two concepts or events producing an ambiguous correlation. 
Cartoon editor Bob Mankoff describes it as “a conflict of synergies” (Popova 2013). It is a 
surprising or amusing event in which one finds enjoyment in a paradox. The event of tactile 
sensation in experiencing a live fish and a fried fish would lead to a collision of concept. In 
addition, this collision of concept might be more mixed up when self-referencing their 
physicality as humans. Bisociative thinking is the mixture of two or more concepts that are 
considered separate by the mind, and thus could be a potential mechanism for creativity. Koestler 
(1976a; 1976b), Finke (1988), Fauconnier (2001), and Nagai et al. (2009) studied bisociative 
thinking, which has much potential in the abstraction process. The bisociative way of thinking is 
unconscious and no reliant on visual experience, and thus is attainable with ease by CB 
individuals. 
This type of cognitive skill allows them to detach from familiarization. This is supported 
robustly by our previous study to modify creative skill enhancement for people with traditional 
viewpoints (Junaidy and Nagai 2012, 2013). Thus, the realm of the mind where blind people 
interpret information and perceive can be extraordinarily distinct from people with normal vision. 
Campbell (1960), Simonton (2013), Cattaneo and Vecchi (2011), Shinohara and Tenenberg 
(2009) reported that creativity requires blind variation and selective retention. The basis for this 
in sensory experience might be that the sighted are bound by what they have already seen. The 
blind may thus have fewer restrictions due to their lack of visual experience. Therefore, there 
could be a surprising correlation between low levels of creativity with sightedness. For sighted 
people, being given a set of examples could also be seen as a means of framing the situation and 
restrict their creativity (Finke and Slayton 1988), we are curious on how CB individuals 
experience such examples when provided verbally (semantically). On the one hand, mental 
imagery, apart from familiarization, allows one to yield a broad distance of conceptualization or 
high-level abstraction. On the other hand, familiarization leads one to think with a narrow 
distance of conceptualization or low-level abstraction. The broader the concept or associative 
concept, the more the possibility of accessing unconventional ideas (Mednick 1962). Therefore, 
involving CB individuals as participants of this project would open a new creative endeavor 
distinct from our existing knowledge. Our research question is to study CB individuals’ visual 
recognition and their ability to associate and reconstruct a concept that we believe has the 
potential to access particular mode of thinking like bisociative thinking. 
 
Visual thinking is in conflict between immature visual cognitive resources and critical adult 
logic. The absence of visual recognition is forced to emerge without the proper resource of the 
visual-mental lexicon that is useful for abstraction. The immature visual cognitive resource must 
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retrieve some logic required by adult common sense based on experience. In fact, the attempt to 
connect dissimilarity between two realms brings a vague concept and estrangement that creates 
an ambiguous concept like “animan” or “manimal.” 
 
We studied the mental imagery of CB individuals during a visual-thinking experiment 
through some particular semantic concepts (e.g., “bird,” “wing,” and “fly”). Those stimuli might 
mean something completely different outside of the visual realm. The forms and concepts of 
“bird,” “wing,” and “fly” are allegedly unlike those of cognitively conceived by sighted people. 
A CB person does not have visual references of the concepts of streamlined shapes, aerodynamic 
shapes, or the mechanical properties of a wing. What is the difference between a bird and a flying 
saucer? Therefore, “a bird with wings to fly” is possibly visualized as a static or curvy figure 
with “one” or “some” wings drawn with zigzag lines or continuous lines with a horizontal or 
even vertical orientation. As CB individuals had greater dissociation memory capacity and 
fidelity for recalling and reduce false memories for the lure (Pasqualotto 2013). Their ability in 
dissociation might lead to an ability to bisociative thinking, making them less reliant on prior 
experience restricting them to some sort of realistic prototype (Homa et al. 2009). This 
dissociation and bisociation might be resourceful for an unconventional idea that will potentially 
be developed for creative products. 
Method 
To investigate the potential visual-thinking ability of CB individuals, we studied distinct mental 
imagery of CB individuals during an activity of clay modeling (during the clay-modeling, the 
participant also told the facilitator the object he or she was making). We observed the visual 
abstraction of CB individuals as they imagined an common animal (a group of entity related with 
a hierarchy and the category, for example, A: Animal; B: Bodily; C: Capability; D: Domain e.g., 
A1, B1, C1, D1 => “A winged bird flying in the air” (this is ontology is demonstrated as Example 
a in Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Physical Ontological Concept of an Animal 
 A: Animal B: Bodily C: Capability D: Domain 
Example a [A1 = bird] [B1 = wing] [C1 = fly] [D1 = air] 
Example b [A2 = cat/snake] [B2 = foot/footless] [C2 = walk/crawl] [D2 = land] 
Example c [A3 = fish] [B3 = fin] [C3 = swim] [D3 = water] 
Source: Data Adapted from Junaidy (2016) 
 
We suspect there can be cross-selection between concepts characterized by their visual-
thinking ability in combinations that indicate bisociative thinking (i.e., A2, B1, C3, D1 => “A 
winged snake swimming in the sky”). 
Participants 
Our study participants were ten congenitally blind students from the School for the Blind in 
Wyata Guna, Indonesia (7 males and 3 females) aged 17-33 (mean age 20). The participants were 
congenitally blind high school students enrolled at a Wyata Guna, one of the biggest schools for 
the blind in Indonesia. The school is mostly comprised of students who reside on campus, but it 
also accepts day students. The students mainly come from East Java. They are also given life 
skills training such as massaging, computer skills, and other lines of work. The ten participants 
have been blind since birth due to congenital and familial optic nerve and retinal problems. 
Participants comes from middle to low class family, where they family entrusted the school to 
give appropriate education and serves elementary, middle and high school students every year at 
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an average of 100 students. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Study approval 
was provided by the officials of the School for the Blind in Wyata Guna, Indonesia. None of the 
participants have sensory or cognitive problems. The five facilitators were teachers and research 
assistants from the same school.  
Procedure 
We conducted a storytelling experiment with a clay modeling activity. A facilitator accompanied 
each participant who was asked to discuss and confirm what they were doing with the clay. The 
five facilitators sat close to each participant, participated in the discussion, and took extensive 
notes throughout the entire clay modeling process to confirm the following: 
▪ Physical attributes of the selected animal. 
▪ Physical mechanisms of attributes of the selected animal. 
▪ Characteristics of the selected animal. 
 
The steps were as follows: 
Experiment 1. Storytelling of a chicken 
Five participants (Group A) were asked to make a clay model of a chicken that included a 
physical ontological concept.  
Time: 15 Minutes 
 
Experiment 2. Storytelling of a land/water/air animal 
Five participants (Group B) were asked to select an animal and make a clay-model that included 
the land/water/air animal’s physical ontological concept. Note that there were no cases of 
participants selecting a violent animal for this experiment; if they had, they would have been 
dissuaded to do so due to the nature of Experiment 3.  
Time: 15 Minutes 
 
Experiment 3. Storytelling of a violent land/water/air animal 
Five participants (Group B) were asked to select a land/water/air animal and make a clay-model 
that included the animal’s savageness, using their mental lexicon of semantic memory. 
Time: 15 Minutes 
 
Group A and Group B were comprised of different people. Group A was for initial 
observation only. Storytelling by CB individuals applies an open-ended storytelling Experiment 
1 by selecting one animal without concern of its domain (land/water/air animal) and its 
characteristic (tame or violent type) for clay-modelling and a story explanation. Experiment 1 
was intended to allow familiarization of the clay material use. A closed-ended storytelling 
experiment was applied during Experiment 2 & 3 with constraints of its domain and its 
characteristics. Mainly, the evaluation in this study of creative visual thinking is based on the 
theory of associative basis of the creative process (Mednick 1962). We evaluate their ideas 
during the clay modeling and its story whether containing more associative concepts that indicate 
more possibility of accessing unconventional ideas (Junaidy and Nagai 2013). Each facilitator 
reports this process and take note of the appearance of ambiguous concept that leads to 
dissociation or bisociative thinking (i.e., “A winged SNAKE swimming in the sky”). 
Experiment 1 was conducted as a pre-condition to ascertain the level and standard of the 
participants’ cognition of familiar animals, while experiments 2 and 3 provided the main data 
that we analyzed. Experiment 2 illustrated participants’ visual-thinking abilities concerning 
physical ontological concepts. Experiment 3 showed their ability to escape from mental 
familiarization towards semantic memory of attributive adjectives of the violent land/water/air 
animal. Such study by Likova (2012) on learning to draw in the blind, and on the corresponding 
dynamics of brain reorganization that explain effectively teaching blind adults on a short time-
scale, it allows the natural dissociation of cross-modal processing subsystems. Therefore, it is 
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possible that CB individual is able to detach subconscious traditional understanding of the 
morphological consequences between animals and their attributes of savageness (composition, 
function, mechanism, interaction, communication) as a form of dissociation; this can also be seen 
in a case study of a blind artist (Amedi et al. 2008).  
We employed Taura and Nagai’s design insight and design outsight theory (2009) to analyze 
the visual abstraction of semantic memory of tame animals and violent animals. We focused 
mainly on insight, which represents the manner of conceiving the artefactual experience in self-
reference/Autopoiesis (a term originally coined by Humberto Maturana). Creative mental 
imagery is indicated by the distance in conceptual space (Gärdenfors 2004). The more creative a 
concept, the more distant the relationship between the concept and the association that is 
produced. A narrow concept distance occurs when someone relates the concept of an “ape” with 
“banana,” “woods,” etc. A broader concept distance of an “ape” leads to “human” and 
“intelligent.” It reminds us of the concept that follows Koestler’s bisociation, which requires two 
incompatible concepts that are not normally associated to synergize and be accepted. 
Results: Analysis of Visual-Thinking in Congenitally Blind Individuals 
Creative mental imagery is indicated by the distance conceptual space (Gärdenfors 2004). The 
more creative a concept, the more distant the relationship between the concept and the 
association that is produced. A narrow concept distance occurs when someone relates the concept 
of an “ape” with “banana,” “woods,” etc. A broader concept distance of an “ape” leads to 
“human” and “intelligent.” The complete absence of vision from birth causes the ability of object 
recognition through mental lexicon to be lost. Thus, the observation towards their approach on 
distinctive memory semantics can be seen through the self-body referencing they perform. The 
main references in confirming uncertainty in determining shape, dimension, body mechanism 
(limb), and visual character leads to three sources, namely: 
a. Shapes and dimensions refer to the self-body referencing (human). 
b. Mechanisms and gestures refer to self-body referencing (human) and familiar animals 
(i.e., cats, chickens, fish). 
c. The visual character and attitudes (i.e., tame or savage) refer to self-body and self-
gesture referencing (human) and familiar animals (i.e., cats, chickens, fish), including 
daily activities such as eating and food to confirm contradictory character differences (a 
negation between good versus evil). 
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Figure 1: Storytelling Experiment of Clay Modeling by Congenitally Blind (CB) Individuals to Seek Potential Visual-
Thinking Through Observation on Their Mental Lexicon of Semantic Memory. 
Source: Junaidy (2016) 
 
The steps were as follows: 
Experiment 1. Storytelling of a chicken 
We asked participants to imagine and make a clay model in the shape of chicken. During the 
process of making the clay model, they verbalized their thoughts and described the chicken. We 
determined that this process of imagining and visualizing a concept of chicken into 3D clay 
modeling and verbalizing their thoughts is a process of storytelling  During this experiment we 
found that instead of experiencing ordinary storytelling of  A,1 B,1 C,1 D1 => “A winged chicken 
walking on the ground,” participants tend to access multiple unusual storytelling (see Table 1). 
Eighty percent of the participants demonstrated unusual combinatorial concepts that likely 
accessed distinct visual abstraction.  
 
The unusual combinatorial occurred from 
It was found that eighty percent of the clay models and the storytelling depicts unusual shape and 
story of a chicken. Some examples of unusual storytelling were structured as follow, A,1,2,.. B,1.,2,.. 
C,1 D1: “A horned chicken running on the land,” “A long-body, long-hand, long-legged chicken 
walking on the land,” “A human-legged chicken walking on the land,” and “A human-shaped 
chicken walking on the land.”  This showed that A: Animal; B: Bodily; C: Capability; D: 
Domain [A1 = chicken/A2 = human/A3 = worm/snake-like,…] => [[B1 = long-legged/B2 = 
horned] + [C2 = walking] + [D3 = land]] A1,2,.., B1.,2,.., C1,, D1 (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Result of Experiment 1. Storytelling of a Chicken 
Source: Junaidy (2016) 
 
Experiment 2. Storytelling experiment of a land/water/air animal 
In the storytelling Experiment 2, five participants were free to model a land/water/air animal. 
Three participants selected land animals (cat, giraffe, and duck) and two participants selected 
water animals (fish and eel). The experiment was observed by facilitators who confirmed the 
participants’ verbal explanation of their clay models. For example, a giraffe is imagined through 
their experience of visiting a zoo and receiving an explanation without particular tactile 
experience. One participant selected an eel because the participant had experience of holding it. 
Fish was quite familiar to the participants, where they had experienced directly touching the fish 
cooked and served at meals. A cat was selected because the participant considered a cat very 
familiar to him and easy to imagine. Direct experience may lead to more precise identification of 
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animal shapes; however, it may also mislead because complete information is not always 
provided. For example, a fried fish or chicken provides misinformation or a highly distorted 
example of what that animal looks like (Homa et al. 2008). This seeming lack of information is 
not necessarily a bad thing, as it could result in the potential for divergent thinking.   
Bisociation is shown by matching up some parts of the human body and mechanical 
movement to these clay animal models. Although each participant successfully imagined a land 
animal or water animal as their nature, with the correct number of properties, in contrast, the 
shape, dimension, gesture, mechanism and mainly visual character referred to human properties. 
The clay model results were categorized as:  
a. Ambiguous concept (because of unfamiliarity and no direct tactile experience) A1,2,…, 
B1,2,…, C1,2,…, A1,2,…: “A human-body-duck with human leg walking on the land,” “A 
human-head-giraffe with human leg walking on the land.” 
b. Explicit concept (because of familiarity and direct tactile experience) A1,2,…, B1,2,…, 
C1,2,…, A1,2,…: “A cat walking on the land,” “A fish swimming in the water,” and “An eel 
laying down on the land.“ 
 
Experiment 3. Storytelling experiment of a “violent“ land/water/air animal 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the shape and dimension of the animal clay model referred to self-
properties of the CB individual himself/herself. For example, they depicted manifestations of the 
head, body, hand, and foot that appeared to resemble members of the human body. Mechanisms 
of motion, gestures, and interactions also tend to display the human motor ability either when 
moving or reaching out. Other referrals are familiar in animals that interact with them on a daily 
basis, such as cat, chicken, and fish. The concept of motion, gesture, and interaction of a tame 
animal is demonstrated with a familiar and ordinary move. As for the concept of ferociousness, 
the negation was demonstrated with radical, aggressiveness, and savageness. A tame eel and a 
violent eel are distinguished by a circular-in position and circular-out position.  
In terms of the visual character, in which participants are required to visualize savage 
characteristics of the animal clay model, human figures with imperfect limbs still remain the 
major reference for depicting the ugliness of savage characteristics. For example, a protruding 
neck, pug nose, gaping mouth, elongated horn, big eyes, fanged teeth, and long nails describe a 
conceptual representation of savageness. In addition to humans as a visual reference, the familiar 
animals around them, e.g., cats or chickens, also become references. Beaks, fangs, claws on 
chickens and cats were perceived as aggressive concepts. 
Allegedly, the incompetence of using a linear mode of thinking, referred as associative 
thinking allows for bisociative thinking occurring as an unintentional mixture of two concepts 
that are normally considered separate by the literal processes of the mind, for example, a sitting 
chicken or a horned duck. The violent duck was visualized with a human-like head, body, and 
legs. For example: 
- The angry-looking duck equipped with a horn and fangs. The violent giraffe likely 
applied a human-like head, body, and legs that included the gesture. 
- A big mouth, wide-open, with a bigger head, and some sharp, long toenails 
characterized the giraffe. 
- The shape and the characteristics of the giraffe were found to be similar to the violent 
cat but without a horn. 
- For the water animal clay model, the violent fish was visualized with a big head and 
body, open extra-wide mouth, and fanged teeth. 
- The violent eel was displayed with a big and thick body.  
Savage characteristics refers to the representation of a badly-characterized human with a 
caricature-like, angry face, wide open mouth, and thick lips, with a unique arrangement of the 
circled-out position to represent violence and a circled-in position to represent a tame eel. 
Overall, the vague shape is a result of unfamiliarity and no direct tactile experience; the clay 
models were being coded as A1,2,.., B1.,2,.., C1,, D1 (See, Figure 3). 




Participant 6 on Experiment 2 & 3 “Tame Duck and Violent Duck” 
 
Violent Duck 



























Figure 3: Storytelling Experiment by Congenitally Blind (CB) Individuals Using Clay Modeling through Given Stimulus: 
“Tame” & “Violent” Land/Water/Air Animals 
Source: Junaidy (2016) 
 
We analyzed that common visual abstraction that occurred was structured as follows: 
A: Animal; B: Bodily; C: Capability; D: Domain 
[A1 = bird] => [[B1 = wing] + [C1 = fly] + [D1 = air]] or 
[A2 = cat/snake] => [[B2 = foot/footless] + [C2 = walk/crawl] + [D2 = land]] or 
Violent Giraffe Tame Giraffe 
Violent Cat Tame Cat 
Participant 7 on Experiment 2 & 3 “Tame Giraffe and Violent Giraffe” 
Violent Girrafe 
Participant 8 on Experiment 2 & 3 “Tame Cat and Violent Cat” 
Violent Cat 
Participant 9 on Experiment 2 & 3 “Tame Fish and Violent Fish” 
Violent Fish 
Participant 9 on Experiment 2 & 3 “Tame Eel and Violent Eel” 
Violent Eel 
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[A3 = fish] => [[B3 = fin] + [C3 = swim] + [D3 = water]] 
A normal derivative structure would be more like: 
A1, B1, C1, D1 => “A winged bird flying in the air” 
A2, B2, C2, D2 => “A footless snake crawling on the land,  
A3, B3, C3, D3 => “A finned fish swimming in the water”  
Thus, it could be concluded that a narrow distance between concept yield of a mere 
conventional concept that evokes no surprise. This type of abstraction implies no distinct 
perceptual discrimination. 
 
We analyzed that distinct visual abstraction that occurred was structured as follows: 
A: Animal; B: Bodily; C: Capability; D: Domain 
[A1 = BIRD] => [[B3 = fin] + [C2 = crawl] + [D3 = water]] or 
[A2 = CAT/SNAKE] => [[B1 = wing] + [C3 = swim] + [D1 = air]] or 
[A3 = FISH] => [[B2 = foot/footless] + [C1 = fly] + [D2 = land]] 
Its derivative structure will be more like: 
A1, B3, C2, D3 => “A finned BIRD crawling in the water” 
A2, B1, C3, D1 => “A winged SNAKE swimming in the sky,  
A3, B2, C1, D2 => “A Footed FISH flying on the land”  
A remote distance between concepts potentially obtains unconventional concepts that evoke 
surprise. Our hypothesis is that a CB individual with no prior visual experience is apt to more 
imaginative storytelling. This type of abstraction implies a distinct perceptual discrimination. 
Discussion of Bisociative Thinking: “Animan” or “Manimal”   
When confronted with the concept of an animal, CB individuals refer to these as properties in 
relation to themselves. It is not merely the process of transferring the concept of the shape from 
human limbs to animals (property mapping). This process is a unique mental imagery that is 
resourceful for bisociative thinking. The examples are ambiguous concept of wings and hand 
shapes; the vague concept of animal and human motion; the vague morphological visual concept 
between animals and humans. This distinct bisociative knowledge discovery gives birth to an 
ambiguous concept such as “crawling chicken” or “sitting chicken.” The concept of “crawling,” 
sitting,” and “chicken” are stem from the CB’s prior knowledge of him/herself as being human. 
The stem produces mental imagery that loosens our prior knowledge about hierarchical relations 
of family resemblance (see, figure 4). 
In this observation, we found that CB individuals, where they have no visual experience, 
will seek referral through the physical nature of their existence and other familiar living beings. 
This is because individuals without visual experiences from birth will likely rely on two major 
sources only; namely, procedural memory (memory for how to do things) and episodic memory 
(memory for specific events). One of the most important resources from long-term memory is 
semantic memory (having to do with words and meaning), which is very less acquired by CB 
individuals (Pasqualotto 2013). 




















Figure 4: A Hierarchical Network Model of Ambiguous Mental Imagery of Storytelling with Clay Modeling by CB 
Individuals (author). Distinct Bisociative Knowledge Discovery Gives Birth to an Ambiguous Concept such as “Crawling 
Duck” or “Sitting Duck.” The Concept of “Crawling,” Sitting,” and “Duck” Stems from Self-Body Referencing that 
Relies on Him/Her as a Super-Reference. 
Source: Junaidy (2016) 
 
Another source to enable participants to mentally visualize on a daily basis is interaction 
with the world around them, whether pet animals or plants. The way they observe something 
demonstrates the nature of perceived learning through haptic experiences, categorization through 
primitive correspondence representation, and bisociation. In short, as a CB individual has no 
prior visual experience from the past, the categorization logic is performed through plain 
correspondence representation of a mental lexicon that is interchangeable (i.e., animal legs, 
furniture legs, human legs). 
 
Our study demonstrated that a CB individual’s visual thinking is in conflict between immature 
visual cognitive resources and critical adult logic. The absence of visual recognition is forced to 
emerge without the proper resource of the visual-mental lexicon that is useful for abstraction. 
The immature visual cognitive resource must retrieve some logic required by adult common 
sense.  CB individuals attempt to connect dissimilar concepts bring feelings of estrangement and 
surprise at the same time. This distinct bisociative knowledge likely redefines concepts, such as 
“bird,” “wing,” and “fly” that might not always be imagined as a concept that correspond to air. 
This explains CB individuals use his/herself as physical reference to visualize concepts in their 
mind. This self-body referencing relies on him/her as a super-reference. This defective mental 
imagery at certain point is useful for abstraction. 
 
Conclusion 
Research involving people with permanent blindness is a challenge. Mental imagery of CB 
individuals is an internal experience that extremely difficult to understand. Our experiment 
requires CB individuals to express internal experiences without experience of visual knowledge, 
which means that we must use a very personal approach. Dialogue through storytelling could 
help CB participants to think-aloud their visual thoughts. A life without absolute visual presence 
requires dependence to interpret and construct a concept and logic. However, this particular 




(A never seen duck) 
HUCK/DUCKMAN  









Has eyes, nose, and mouth 
Breathes 
Eats 
Can get angry 





Has eyes, nose, and mouth 
Breathes 
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*Can get angry 




































(A duck can sit) 
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Our research is based on an awareness towards equal opportunity and the importance of 
capacity building for those who are often excluded from full employment in society. At the same 
time, we realized the untapped potential that is possible to be contributed from CB individuals 
for their, and our, benefit. Our endeavor on the discovery of unique visual-thinking that belongs 
to CB individual is promising, giving impact to communities through further research of the 
model of co-product design development that acknowledges distinct mental imagery processes 
uniquely possessed by CB individuals. Together with designers, this approach can be 
implemented widely in the product R&D process in some industries. The creative products that 
are potentially suitable to be developed in this very approach are toy design, doll design, 
stationery design, and other conceptual products.  
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